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ECONOMIC ORTHODOXY AND 
EXTERNALITIES REVISITED 
By R. C. d'Arge and E. K. Hunr:' 
As the title indicated, our article was intended primarily as a 
critique. l Many substantial criticisms of orthodoxy were offered. 
Almost none of these criticisms were questioned by William W. 
Brown and Morgan Reynolds in their critique.2 Therefore, before 
addressing ourselves to their "appraisal" we should stress that, 
regardless of the merit or lack of merit of their objections, the 
bulk of our article is not questioned or criticized in their "ap-
praisal." 
Much of the article by Brown and Reynolds is mere rhetoric 
which has absolutely no relation to anything contained in our 
article. They write, "Apparently, mundane questions about the 
empirical success or failure of economic analysis is of no concern 
for d'Arge and Hunt." Upon what is such an errantly absurd 
statement based? Certainly not the article nor anything else 
either of us has ever written. Again they write, "Perhaps eco-
nomic investigations of information and transaction costs, 
alternative property right assignments, and uncertainty ... are 
yielding results which [d'Arge and Hunt] do not like." Such 
unsubstantiated and nonsensical statements could only have 
been thrown in for their polemical and ad hominem effect. 
Their principle objections to our article appear to be: (1) that 
we misinterpreted our quotation from Graaff, (2) that we were 
unreasonable in characterizing orthodox theory as "unrealistic," 
(3) that we were in error when we asserted that orthodox theory 
treats externalities as freakish anomalies, (4) that we were 
"troubled by the lack of organized markets where trades in ex-
ternal effects could be consummated," (5) that our alternative 
policy proposals are naive, (6) that we misrepresent the nature of 
orthodox utility theory, and (7) that our attack on the normative 
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assumptions of orthodox theory is illegitimate-because ortho-
dox theory is "positive" and not normative. 
These objections were given in a modified order because we 
believe that objection number (7) which appears first in their 
article deserves extended comment, and we therefore wish to 
treat it last. The following is our response to their seven objec-
tions, in the order which we listed. 
The first objection is easily disposed of. Our quotation from 
Graaff was not based upon a misunderstanding. Graaff was, in 
fact, analyzing the entire foundation of the normative theory of 
Pareto optimum, just as we suggested. We recommend that the 
interested reader (including Brown and Reynolds) read or re-
read the whole of Graaff. As an alternative we refer readers to 
1. M. D. Little's review of Graaff's book in the 1957 volume of 
Economica, in which the destructive, iconoclastic nature of the 
book is spelled out. Or the reader can peruse E. J. Mishan's 
definitive "A Survey of Welfare Economics, 1939-59" in which 
Mishan states: "Graaff is less compromising. On a close examina-
tion, he asserts, every proposition in welfare economics is found 
wan ting."3 
Our critics' second point is that we unfairly characterize ortho-
dox theory as unrealistic. They state: "We wonder if [d'Arge 
and Hunt] are equally concrned about the effect of assuming a 
perfect vacuum upon the ability to predict the flight of a cannon 
ball. Do the 'unrealistic' models of molecular structure prevent a 
chemist from predicting that combining hydrogen and oxygen 
yields water." 
Really?! Since when do the accomplishments of physicists and 
chemists become serviceable in breathing realism into grotesquely 
unrealistic economic theory? A quotation from Norbert Wiener 
seems a ppropria te : 
The success of mathematical physics led the social scientist to be 
jealous of its power without quite understanding the intellectual 
attitudes that had contributed to this power. The use of mathema-
tical formulae had accompanied the development of the natural 
sciences and become the mode in the social sciences. Just as primitive 
peoples adopt the Western modes of denationalized clothing and 
parliamentarism out of a vague feeling that these magic rites and 
vestments will at once put them abreast of modern culture and tech-
nique, so the economists have developed the habit of dressing up 
their rather imprecise ideas in the language of the infinitesimal cal-
culus.4 
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The same point was elegantly made by the economist F. H. 
Hahn, himself a leading economic theoretician: 
The achievements of economic theory in the last two decades are 
both impressive and in many ways beautiful. But it cannot be denied 
that there is something scandalous in the spectacle of so many people 
refining the analyses of economic states which they give no reason to 
suppose will ever, or have ever, come about. It probably is also 
dangerous. Equilibrium economics, because of its well known welfare 
economics implications, is easily converted into an apologia for 
existing economic arrangements and it is frequently so converted . 
. . . It is an unsatisfactory and slightly dishonest state of affairs.5 
In defending the realism of orthodox neoclassical economic 
theory, most devotees rest their case on the authority not of 
great physical scientists but of other orthodox economists. In 
what is, perhaps, the most highly regarded summary of orthodox 
neoclassical economics, Professor C. E. Ferguson states that 
until econometricians have found answers to certain questions 
which plague orthodoxy: 
... placing reliance upon neoclassical economic theory is a matter of 
faith. I personally have the faith; but at present the best I can do 
to convince others is to invoke the weight of Samuelson's authority.6 
The third criticism is easily disposed of. Brown and Reynolds 
ask if it is true that economists treat externalities simply as 
freakish anomalies, then "how do [d'Arge and Hunt] account 
for the flood of articles on the subject" in recent times? The 
answer is simple: we did not say that articles on externalities 
were freakish anomalies, rather, that in the "flood of articles on 
the subject" many orthodox economists treated externalities as 
freakish anomalies. 
Our critics' fourth point is rather strange. They attribute to 
us a poin t of view that we took some pains to discredi t in our 
article. They state that we are "troubled by the lack of organized 
markets where trades in external effects could be consummated." 
In fact, it is a large segment of orthodox economists who are so 
troubled. What we attempted to show is that such concern is 
quite meaningless because it is based on a set of assumptions 
about social behavior and the connection between the economy 
and the natural environment which in no way are consistent 
with even casual empirical observation. It appears that in their 
haste to find fault they have unwittingly and inadvertently 
joined us in criticizing this particular facet of orthodoxy. 
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Next Brown and Reynolds criticize our policy recommenda-
tions. The gist of their criticism is that the private enterprise 
system would continue to operate in much the same way it now 
operates even if an expenditure ceiling were imposed. Further-
more, despite their protestations of normative innocence, it is 
obvious that this incites their moral approbation. We do not 
share their Panglossian faith. One does not have to endorse 
Milton Friedman's apotheosis of the present market capitalist 
economic system to appreciate the fact that our proposed solu-
tions could not be imposed upon our economic system without 
drastically changing many other fundamental social and eco-
nomic institutions. Since our paper was primarily a critique 
of economic orthodoxy, we did not think it the appropriate place 
to spell out all of the changes which we believe would be necessary 
to successfully implement our policy proposals. These proposals 
were mentioned, in passing, to stimulate new thinking-not to 
give a definitive defense which would persuade rigid, confirmed 
believers in economic orthodoxy. However, their critique of our 
policy proposals is largely based on questioning of the principle 
of conservation of mass-energy. There is not even the slightest 
hint in our article that we believe the "production of investment 
goods does not generate wastes but consumption goods do." 
We emphasized the obvious fact that "the more material goods 
generated in an economy, the more air borne, water borne, and 
solid wastes that will accumulate," but also stated that produc-
tion of consumption goods increases the immediate flow of wastes 
since these goods are immediately consumed and therefore ap-
pear as wastes more rapidly than do investment goods. 
The sixth criticism is no less empty than the rest. When we 
asserted that modern orthodoxy was based upon a variant of 
hedonism, we were giving it the benefit of the doubt. Hedonism 
is, generally, a theory with real empirical content that can, in 
principle, be refuted. We were perfectly aware that some econo-
mists had expanded the meaning of utility in order to give their 
theory of choice a more realistic ring. We, however, agree with 
Paul Samuelson that this expanded notion of utility maximiza-
tion "is consistent with all conceivable behavior and refutable 
by none."7 Our critics have achieved merely a Pyrrhic victory 
by elevating orthodoxy to a non-operational and meaningless 
level. 
The last and most important point made by our critics is that 
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the theory we described as economic orthodoxy is positive and 
not normative. They ask the rhetorical question: "Can you 
imagine the reaction of a Newton, Galileo, Boyle, Mendel or 
Leaky to the charge that their theories were vulnerable on psy-
chological and ethical grounds?" We ask if you can imagine the 
reactions of these men to the assertion that their theories some-
how render an obviously normative economic theory invulner-
able to psychological or ethical cri ticisms? 
The view that the theory of Paretian optimality is entirely 
positive and not normative is unusual to say the least. The most 
extreme statment we had encountered before reading that of our 
present critics was by Robert Dorfman, Paul Samuelson and 
Robert Solow, who wrote that the notion "of a Pareto-optimum 
... is a standard tool of welfare economics; its importance comes 
from the fact that it provides a weak, universally acceptable, 
criterion of when one economic configuration is 'better' in a wel-
fare sense than another."8 This statement, while not going to the 
extreme absurdity of stating that the analysis of Pareto-optimum 
is value free, nevertheless asserts that the values underlying the 
analysis are universally acceptable. This seems a little extreme. 
The area of social welfare criteria usually generates considerable 
controversy. We therefore wish to do two things: (1) make ex-
plicit what normative values underly the orthodox use of the 
notion of Pareto-optimum as a welfare criterion, (2) briefly look 
at the question of why economists might think these values are 
universally acceptable (or, in the case of our critics, nonexistent). 
The necessary and sufficient conditions for utilizing the Pareto-
optimal criterion for comparing alternative economic configura-
tions are the specifications of all constraints embodied in each 
configuration and a set of social welfare criterion applicable to 
all economic configurations or states. It is in the definitions and 
identification of the sets of social welfare criteria and constraints 
that the problem of universal acceptability arises. In orthodox 
theory, the social welfare criteria are often reduced to two prin-
ciples: one, the "pig principle" that "if you like something, more 
is 'better' and secondly, that individual preferences are the 
unique measures of social welfare. Acceptance of these criteria 
means that the orthodox economist must approve of all individ-
ual consumer tastes which are backed by sufficient purchasing 
power. And since these tastes are the ultimate value criteria of 
their Paretian Optimality analysis, they must approve of all of 
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the social and economic processes by which these tastes are 
formed (and also assume that all individuals have knowledge of 
all important characteristics of all goods-or approve of the way 
in which they are acquiring that knowledge). 
Inherent in the acceptance of the social constraints, within the 
context of which the orthodox criteria are defined, are a great 
many value judgments which orthodox economists generally 
accept. 9 They must either approve of or disregard the moral im-
plications of the existing distribution of income,1° or must assume 
that appropriate actions will produce a morally desirable income 
distribution before the theory becomes relevant;l1 they must 
approve of, disregard, or assume appropriate changes will be 
made in the distribution of wealth; they must approve of ... 
etc., the existing systems of laws and rules-including the laws 
of private property and the operation of social control,12 They 
must approve ... etc., of the power structure and the way in 
which power is wielded; they must assume there are no handi-
capped individuals, or, in economists' jargon, they must assume 
that every person has an initial endowment with which he can 
"both survive and participate in the market"13 (otherwise, while 
we are enjoying our "best of all possible worlds," Paretian Opti-
mality, some people may be starving). 
When we look at these supposedly "universally acceptable" 
normative assumptions, we are forced to agree with S. K. Nath 
when he asks, 
Where are the value judgements supposed to be widely acceptable? 
For it is very likely that the value judgements that are likely to be 
widely acceptable differ from one society to another. Some writers 
would like to believe that a common set of value judgements would be 
acceptable in what have been described as the countries of the West. 
But this is too sanguine. The different histories of social-security 
measures (with the greatest contrast being provided perhaps by 
Britain and the United States) are ample refutation of any such 
presumption.14 
In fact, the orthodox Paretian judgement that whatever each 
individual prefers is always best for him is explicitly denied by 
a host of legislative measures. "Compulsory education, compul-
sory national insurance, tax on tobacco and alcohol, subsidized 
milk, libraries, national parks and concert halls, to mention only 
the more obvious examples,"15 are measures based on the widely 
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held assumption that the individual is not always the best judge 
of his own welfare. The commonsense knowledge that most ad-
vertising seeks to "brainwash" the individual for the profit of 
large corporations also refutes the basis of the conventional 
Paretian value judgement. Moreover, it is grotesquely unrealis-
tic to imagine we could get universal agreement on the issues of 
what are morally proper distributions of income, wealth and 
power. Thus, the assertion that the traditional use of the criterion 
of Paretian optimality is based on values that are "universally 
acceptable" is, at best, silly. The notion that orthodox welfare 
economics is only positive analysis and contains no normative 
elements-and hence is invulnerable to normative criticism-
is so patently absurd that we cannot imagine anyone taking it 
seriously. 
Orthodox welfare economics is loaded with value judgements-
most of them controversial. And even if we grant the basic value 
assumptions of Pareto optimum analysis the results of the analy-
sis have little to recommend them. "One does not have to go 
very deep into philosophy to observe rather tritely with Frank 
Knight and others that want satisfaction is not a particularly 
worthy ethical ideal."16 
Economists persist in traditional neoclassical welfare analysis 
for one very basic reason. It is an elaborate apology for the 
status quo. The analysis becomes pernicious when ideological 
apologetics parade as "pure science" which is "value free" and 
"objective." The distinguished English economist Joan Robin-
son has wri tten : 
There has been a great deal of confused controversy about the 
question of "value judgements" in the social sciences. Every human 
being has ideological, moral and political views. To pretend to have 
none and to be purely objective must necessarily be either self-
deception or a device to deceive others. A candid writer will make 
his preconceptions clear and allow the reader to discount them if he 
does not accept them. This concerns the professional honour of the 
scientist. But to eliminate value judgements from the subject-matter 
of social science is to eliminate the subject itself, for since it concerns 
human behavior it must be concerned with the value judgments 
people make.17 
Perhaps the most intellectually gifted proponent of the point 
of view that "analytic" or "scientific" elements in economic 
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thought should be isolated from "ideologies" or "value precon-
ceptions" was Joseph A. Schumpeter. Despite this advocacy, he 
tried to deceive neither himself nor others: 
Factual work and "theoretical" work, in an endless reaction of give 
and take, naturally testing one another and setting new tasks for 
each other, will eventually produce scientific models, the provisional 
joint products of their interaction with the surviving elements of the 
original vision, to which increasingly more rigorous standards of 
consistency and adequacy will be applied. This is indeed a primitive 
but not, I think, misleading statement of the process by which we 
grind out what we call scientific propositions. Now it is perfectly 
clear that there is a wide gate for ideology to enter into this process. 
In fact, it enters on the very ground floor, into the preanalytic cog-
nitive act of which we have been speaking. Analytic work begins 
with material provided by our vision of things, and this vision is 
ideological almost by definition. It embodies the picture of things as 
we see them, and wherever there is any possible motive for wishing to 
see them in a given rather than another light, the way in which we 
see things can hardly be distinguished from the way in which we 
wish to see them. The more honest and naive our vision is, the more 
dangerous it is to the eventual emergence of anything for which gen-
eral validity can be claimed.Is 
Thus, appeals to the scientific accomplishements of Newton, 
Galileo, Boyle, Mendel or Leaky will not hide the obviously 
ideological nature of orthodox welfare economics, nor make it 
invulnerable to psychological and ethical criticisms. A most 
interesting question would be why so many defenders of ortho-
doxy (and the social and economic status quo) imagine their 
analyses to be value-free. Perhaps like bad breath, one's own 
ideology may be difficult for one to perceive . 
... >._>.-<_ ...... 
FOOTNOTES 
.:. Mr. d'Arge is an Associate Professor of Economics, and Mr. Hunt 
an Assistant Professor of Economics, both at the University of Cali-
fornia, Riverside. 
1 R. C. d'Arge and E. K. Hunt, "Environmental Pollution, Ex-
ternalities, and Conventional Economic Wisdom: A Critique," Environ-
mental Affairs, Vol. 1 No.2 p. 266 (June 1971). 
2 W. Brown and M. Reynolds, "d'Arge and Hunt on Externalities 
and EconomiclOrthodoxy: A Critique Appraised," Environmental 
Affairs, Vol. 1 No.4 p. 837 (March, 1972). 
EXTERNALITIES REVISITED 853 
3 E. J. Mishan, "A Survey of Welfare Economics, 1939-59" in The 
American Economics Association and Royal Economic Society Surveys 
of Economic Theory, Vol. I p. 208, New York: St. Martin's Press (1966). 
4 N. Weiner, God and Golem, Inc., p. 91, Cambridge: M.LT. Press. 
5 F. H. Hahn, "Some Adjustment Problems," Econometrica, 38(1) 
pp. 1-2 (1970). 
6 C. E. Ferguson, The Neoclassical Theory of Production and Dis-
tribution, pp. xvii-xviii, Cambridge, England: The Cambridge Uni-
versity Press (1969). 
7 P. A. Samuelson, Foundations of Economic Analyses, pp. 91-92 
Harvard University Press (1953). 
8 R. Dorfman, P. A. Samuelson and R. M. Solow, Linear Program-
ming and Economic Analysis, p. 409, New York: McGraw-Hill (1958). 
Emphasis added. 
9 In preparing this paragraph we were benefited by perusing an ex-
cellent, but as yet unpublished, paper by Professor W. J. Samuels, 
entitled "Welfare Economics, Power and Property." 
10 E. J. Mishan, "Pareto Optimality and the Law," Oxford Eco-
nomic Papers Vol. 19 p. 279 (1967). 
11 P. A. Samuelson, supra note 7 at 214. 
12 T. C. Koopmans, Three Essays on the State of Economic Science, 
p. 54, New York: McGraw Hill (1957); and J. M. Buchanan, "The 
Relevance of Pareto Optimality," Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 
6 pp. 241-354 (1966). 
13 T. C. Koopmans, supra note 12 at 59. 
14 S. K. Nath, A Reappraisal of Welfare Economics, p. 126, New York: 
Augustus M. Kelly Publishers (1969). 
15Id. 
16 S. S. Alexander, "Comment on Political and Economic Evaluation 
of Social Effects and Externalities," in J. Margolis, The Analysis of 
Public Output, p. 28, New York: The National Bureau of Economic 
Research (1970). 
17 J. Robinson, Freedom and Necessity, An Introduction to the Study 
of Society, p. 122 New York: Pantheon Books (1970). 
18 J. A. Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis, pp. 42-43, New 
York: Oxford University Press (1954). 
